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Abstract
Learning theoretic aspects of mathematics and logic have been studied by many authors. They study how mathematical and
logical objects are algorithmically “learned” (inferred) from ﬁnite data. Although they study mathematical objects, the objective of
the studies is learning. In this paper, a mathematics whose foundation itself is learning theoretic will be introduced. It is called Limit-
Computable Mathematics. It was originally introduced as a means for “Proof Animation”, which is expected to make interactive
formal proof development easier. Although the original objective was not learning theoretic at all, learning theory is indispensable
for our research. It suggests that logic and learning theory are related in a still unknown but deep new way.
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1. Mathematics based on learning?
Mathematical or logical concepts seem to be one of the main research targets of learning theory and its applications.
Shapiro [24] investigated how axioms systems are inductively inferred by ideas of learning theory. We may say that
Shapiro studied how logical systems (axiom systems) are learned. Stephan andVentsov [27] investigated how algebraic
structures are learned and have given some interesting learning theoretic characterizations of fundamental algebraic
notions.
Wemay say that they investigated learnability of themathematical concepts. Contrary to them,we are nowdeveloping
a mathematics whose semantics and reasoning system are inﬂuenced by ideas from computational learning theory. Let
us compare these two lines of research.
In Shapiro’s work, the concepts of validity and models are the standard ones from Tarskian semantics, and learning
of axiom systems in Horn-logic from models is investigated. On the other hand, we give semantics of the ﬁrst order
formulas by means of “learnability”. For example, ∃y.A(x, y), which reads as “there exists y satisfying A(x, y)”, is
interpreted as “the value of y satisfying A(x, y) is learnable from the value of x”.
What does “y is learnable from the value of x” mean? It means that we have a learning algorithm to produce an
answer according to a learning theoretic framework. There are several different frameworks of learning theory, such
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as inductive inference (incremental learning) and PAC-learning. They are classiﬁed into further subframeworks, for
example BC-learning and EX-learning are subframeworks of Inductive Inference.
If we ﬁx one of such learning theory frameworks, then we can deﬁne a new “logic”. It may not be a proper logic.
We can deﬁne a kind of semantics for it, that is, an interpretation of propositions, but it may not be even closed
under expected logical rules such as modus ponens. In this paper, our learning theoretic frameworks are restricted to
incremental learning, namely, inductive inference or identiﬁcation in the limit.
So far, incremental learning is the only good framework for logic. We have found that subframeworks such as EX-
learning and BC-learning have slightly different meaningful logics. A new learning theoretic framework “Popperian
game” has been found through an investigation of relationship between our mathematics and reverse mathematics [26].
So far we do not know the whole picture of the links between logic and learning theory. Many fundamental questions
have not been answered. We do not even know if there are logics corresponding to frameworks beyond incremental
learning such as PAC-learning. Nonetheless, my thesis is that learning theory and logic are related much more deeply
than we now think. In this largely expository paper, I will explain known relationships between the rules of classical
logic and incremental learning, which are the bases of my conviction.
2. Objectives and backgrounds
The real goal of Limit-Computable Mathematics, abbreviated to LCM, is a methodology of testing and debugging
formal proofs introduced in [18]. I will brieﬂy explain the background of the research below.Amore technically detailed
exposition of objectives and backgrounds can be found in [16].
Our mathematics was found through an investigation of interactive formal proof developments. The area is mainly
known by the names of proof checkers such as NQTHM, HOL PVS, COQ, . . . . It may be regarded as a branch of
the broad area of formal methods, which aims to utilize formal languages, formal semantics, and formal proofs for
developments of software and hardware systems. Formal veriﬁcation, formal speciﬁcations, model checking are all
branches of the formal methods, and formal proof development is a basic technology for the entire area.
In the mid 80s formal methods community realized importance of validation of formal speciﬁcations. In the formal
veriﬁcation project of the 8-bits Viper chip for military and other safety-critical uses, it was found that errors in large
scale speciﬁcations are much more serious than had been anticipated and that the ultimate way to detect them must be
somehow informal. Ultimate requirements of systems are in human minds. They are often unclear and even unstable.
Vague informal things cannot be veriﬁed in a formal way. Thus, informal things must be translated into formal things.
However, the errors may be in the translation of informal things into formal things. Thus, informal and empirical
methodologies are important even in formal methods.
I found similar difﬁculties in formal proof developments in my own project. Goals and subgoals (lemmas), and
deﬁnitions of concepts could be formalized in wrong ways. There was no formal way to detect the wrong formal-
izations. However, I found that testing formal proofs under development is an extremely efﬁcient way to detect such
errors on translation of informal things to formal things. The PX proof system [15], which was designed to extract
“certiﬁed” functional programs from formal proofs, could extract programs ﬁnely representing computational contents
of intuitionistic proofs. By testing such programs in the usual sense, errors in deﬁnitions and lemmas (subgoals) in
the formal proofs were quickly detected. Since the technique is similar to a formal method technique “speciﬁcation
animation” testing speciﬁcation on examples, I called it proof animation, abbreviated to PA.
I proposed to use proof animation to make formal proof developments less costly in [18]. Since the method was
applicable only to intuitionistic proofs, I had to ﬁnd a method applicable to classical proofs. Berardi’s semantics [4]
approximating classical proofs by ﬁnitely restricted version of the proofs was a possible candidate. Just by chance,
I found that Berardi’s examples are very similar to Hilbert’s original reasoning of his famous ﬁnite basis theorem
proved in the late 19th century (see [16] for details). Akihiro Yamamoto pointed out to me that both are the same as
the limit notions in learning theory. AfterYamamoto’s suggestion, I found that “computation in the limit” or “limiting
recursion” corresponds to restricted forms of classical principles such as the law of excluded middle applied to an
arithmetical formula with a single quantiﬁer, e.g., 01-formulas, and learning theoretic notions are very useful for proof
animation.
I will refer to these restricted principles as “semi-classical principles”. Logicians including myself tend to think that
the limit-recursive functions and semi-classical principles would not make a good logic. They look so fragmentary.
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At ﬁrst, I doubted even its closure under the usual inference rules of constructive logic. Even S. Feferman, one of the
most notable logicians of the present time, had the same impression.
However, to my surprise, the logic deﬁned by limiting recursion was very natural, and remarkably wide realms
of mathematical proofs were found to use only these weak classical principles instead of the full power of classical
principles. Thus, it seemed possible to developmost formal proofs only with semi-classical principles and animate them
by computation in the limit. Since it is based on the limit, I named such a mathematics Limit-Computable Mathematics,
LCM.
To build LCM-tools for formal proof developments, there are some theoretical questions to be solved. The standard
limit notations are not adequate to represent limit-structures of proofs, and so a concurrent calculus of limit processes
must be deﬁned and implemented as a kind of programming language. It is not known if impredicative reasonings have
LCM-interpretations. Is it possible to extend the proof animation by limit beyond LCM? 1 There are some important
and interesting theoretical questions to be solved to build realistic LCM-environments.
LCM is also interesting as a branch of pure mathematics. It seems related to recursion theory, to reverse mathematics
[26], to game semantics [12] and even to computation theories over real numbers [21,31]. For example, in this paper,
we will sketch an interesting relationship of a very weak principle of excluded middle to weak König’s Lemma in
reverse mathematics and the relationship is maintained by a sort of learning by erasing wrong hypotheses.
3. Semantics
In this section, we explain LCM by giving its informal semantics A formal semantics is given in the appendix. The
semantics of LCM given below is a variant of Brouwer–Heyting–Kolmogorov interpretation (BHK interpretation) of
intuitionistic mathematics. In the early 20th century, a famed mathematician L.E.J. Brouwer attacked usage of the
traditional Aristotelian logic in mathematics. He attacked especially the law of the excluded middle A ∨ ¬A. Since he
interpreted “A or B” as “there is an algorithm decidingA or B”, the law was the same to him as saying “all mathematical
problems are decidable by a universal algorithm”. Thus, he rejected it and created a mathematics which did not employ
such principles. He called his mathematics intuitionistic mathematics and the usual mathematics was called classical
mathematics. 2
Morphologically, intuitionistic mathematics is a subset of classical mathematics in which the law of excluded middle
and its equivalents are forbidden. Brouwer had a philosophical reason to reject the law, and to guarantee correctness of
other rules. However, his philosophical principle was rather subjective, mysterious and unclear for the rational minds
of most mathematicians and logicians.
Later, Heyting and Kolmogorov gave a much clearer and objective interpretation for Brouwer’s mathematics without
Brouwer’s philosophy. The interpretation is now called BHK-interpretation. Although BHK-interpretation was much
clearer, it was still somehow unclear since the undeﬁned notion of “construction” was employed and the semantics was
explained in informal languages. To make it ultimately clear, Kleene replaced “constructions” with partial recursive
functions and gave a translation of a formula into a formula representing his version of BHK-interpretation. Kleene
named it “realizability interpretation”. Introductory accounts of BHK-interpretation and realizabilities are found in
[7,10,29].
Our semantics of LCM given below is obtained from BHK-interpretation by replacing constructions with limiting
recursive functions. It will be called limit-BHK-interpretation. Since BHK-interpretation is rather informal, there
are many different ways to make it formal. Formal versions can be different to each other in some essential ways.
The informal semantics (limit-BHK-interpretation) may be regarded as a guideline or a framework such as object
oriented modeling paradigm. Thus, it does not specify the details of the semantics. Details must be given by a formal
semantics like realizability interpretations, which correspond to actual object oriented programming languages such as
Java and C++.
Now we give limit-BHK interpretation of mathematics. We will describe what ﬁrst order logical formulas of the
forms, ∃x.A(x), ∀x.A(x), A∨B, A∧B, A⇒B mean in limit-BHK interpretation for each case. The crucial cases are
1 Berardi is extending his limit-semantics [9] to 0n-reasonings. His results suggest that there might be a way to animate proofs by the law of
excluded middle applied to any arithmetical formula.
2 Intuitionistic mathematics have many variants. Among these variants are constructive mathematics and Brouwer’s mathematics [10].
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A∨B and ∃x.A(x). Brouwer regarded correctness of A∨B as the ability to decide which of A and B is correct and to
prove the correct one. For example, let A denote the statement “ZF set theory is consistent” and B denote the statement
“ZF set theory is inconsistent”. Then the statement A ∨ B holds if we can ﬁnd out which statement C ∈ {A,B} is true
and we furthermore give a proof of the correctness of C. Since consistency of a formal system is a01-statement, there
is no general algorithm to decide it and Gödel’s incompleteness theorem tells us that it is impossible to assert one of
them by a reasonable method, even if we believe in the consistency.
In limit-BHK interpretation, the obligation to “decide” A or B is relaxed to “learn” A or B. We say A ∨ B is correct
in the sense of limit-BHK interpretation iff we have a computable guessing function g(t) such that
(1) g(t) converges to 0 or 1,
(2) if limt g(t) = 0 then, A is correct in limit-BHK-sense,
(3) if limt g(t) = 1 then, B is correct in limit-BHK-sense.
Let g(t) be
g(t) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if there is a proof of length up, to t which shows that ZF
set theory is inconsistent,
0 otherwise.
Obviously g satisﬁes the three conditions above. Thus, the law of the excluded middle applied to the consistency of ZF
set theory is correct in the sense of limit-BHK-interpretation.
Remark 1. Assume that g is a guessing function of some function h. How does this h look like? A guessing function
of an n-ary function is n + 1-ary. Since g is unary, it is a guessing function of a 0-ary function h. That is, h satisﬁes
h() = x for some x. Although a guessing function of a 0-ary function seems to be rare in learning theory, it is quite
useful in LCM.
Note that we need the law of excluded middle to prove the convergence of g. Thus, this does not help to decide
if the system is consistent or not at all. 3 “ZF set theory is consistent or not in limit-BHK-interpretation” means that
consistency of ZF set theory is computable in the limit. Since we cannot compute the limit in Turing’s sense, this does
not help to understand consistency of formal systems anyway.
However, limit-BHK-interpretation gives a systematic way to approximate a non-computable truth by a guessing
function. The approximation given by a guessing function helps to understand computational contents of a class of
non-computational or non-constructive proofs. It was the original aim of my proof animation technique to give a
method by which classical proofs in mathematics are computationally analyzable through actual execution. Although
LCM-proofs cannot be executed in Turing’s sense, they are approximately executable by guessing functions.And, such
approximate executions are adequate for proof animation as discussed in Section 5.
The interpretation of A ∨ B above has a defect. We have to assert A is correct in limit-BHK-sense, if limt g(t) is
0. Just as the guessing function g approximates the truth of the outermost disjunction of A ∨ B, a guessing function
approximating the truth of A must be given. Technically, it is better to give such a guessing function for A together with
the guessing function g for the disjunction. The corrected deﬁnition of a guessing function of A ∨ B is as follows:
(1) g(t) is a pair (g1(t), g2(t)) and g(t) converges as t → ∞,
(2) if limt g1(t) = 0 then, g2 is a guessing function of A,
(3) if limt g1(t) 
= 0 then, g2 is a guessing function of B.
Similarly, asserting the existential statement “∃x.A(x)” is interpreted to give its guessing function g(t) with the
following conditions:
(1) g(t) is a pair (g1(t), g2(t)) and g(t) converges as t → ∞,
(2) g2 is a guessing function of A(m), where m = limt g1(t).
3 Berardi [4] has given a limit-semantics without this kind of classical reasoning at meta-level. Since the condition of convergence is replaced
with a computationally weak one in his semantics, it does not give the limit value either.
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Asserting an existential or disjunctive formula means giving a guessing function by which we can compute in the
limit the information on the existential quantiﬁer “x of ∃x.A(x) and information forA(x)” or on disjunction “the correct
disjunct of A ∨ B and information for the disjunct”. Such a guessing function will be called a guessing function of
the statement. In general, giving a limit-BHK-interpretation to a formula is deﬁning the conditions of the guessing
functions for the formula. When a guessing function satisfying the conditions exists, the formula is valid or correct in
limit-BHK-interpretation. Such a formula will be said to be limit-BHK-correct for short.
The conditions on a guessing function g of a conjunctive statement A ∧ B is given as follows:
(1) g(t) is a pair (g1(t), g2(t)),
(2) g1 is a guessing function of A and g2 is a guessing function of B.
The condition of a guessing function g(x, t) of a universal statement ∀x.A(x) is
• g(x, t) converges to a guessing function of A(x) for all x.
Similarly the condition of a guessing function g(x, t) of A⇒B is
• if f is a guessing function of A, then g(f, t) converges to a guessing function of B.
The conditions for the universal quantiﬁer and the implication are somehow problematic, since limits of guessing func-
tions are again guessing functions. There are two major different approaches on functions incidentally corresponding
to the approaches to functions in EX-learnability and BC-learnability.
In his original interpretation, Kleene treated functions as “programs” or “indices” as EX-learnability. This approach
is called intensional. Kreisel’s modiﬁed realizability interpretation can treat functions as their extensions as in the usual
set theoretical mathematics, i.e., two functions are equal iff their graphs are equal. This approach is called extensional
and apparently corresponds to BC-learnability by Case and Smith. Kleene-style intensional interpretation is given in
the appendix. A realizability using extensional approach is possible by the construction in [2].
Finally, we give interpretation of non-logical formulas such as equations and ⊥. A non-logical atomic formula F is
considered limit-BHK-correct iff it is correct in the ordinary sense. Since asserting a statement means giving a guessing
function, we have to deﬁne guessing functions for F. Since guessing functions are meaningless for this case, we may
take any guessing function converging as far as F is correct in the sense of Tarski semantics. The condition on a guessing
function g(t) of an atomic non-logical formula F is
• g(t) converges and F holds.
The convergence condition is not very important. We may drop it.
Note that an interpretation of negation ¬A has not been given. It is understood to be an abbreviation of A⇒⊥, and
its semantics is given by this formula. ⊥ is the atomic formula representing a contradiction such as 0 = 1. By the
deﬁnition for atomic formulas, there is no guessing function of the formula ⊥, which never holds. If A and A⇒⊥
both have guessing functions, then it yields a contradiction. Thus if A⇒⊥ has a guessing function, A does not. If A
does not have any guessing function, then any function g(t) is a guessing function A⇒⊥ since the condition becomes
vacuously true. Namely, A⇒⊥ is limit-BHK-correct iff A cannot have any guessing function.
It would be worth noting that if guessing functions g(x, t) are all trivial, i.e. g(x, t) = g(x, 0), then limit-BHK-
interpretation becomes the usual BHK-interpretation of intuitionistic mathematics.
4. Semi-classical principles
In this section, semi-classical principles of LCM are introduced. Detailed expositions on them including prenex
normal form theorem and a provability hierarchy can be found in [1]. A 0n-formula is a formula of the form
∀x1∃x2 · · ·Qxn.A, where A is a formula for a recursive relation. 0n-formula is deﬁned similarly.
• 0n-LEM is A ∨ ¬A for any 0n-formula A. LEM stands for Law of Excluded Middle.
• 0n-LEM is deﬁned similarly.
• 0n-DNE is ¬¬A⇒A for any 0n-formula A. DNE stands for Double Negation Elimination.
By the same argument for the consistency of ZF set theory, 01-LEM ∀x.A(x) ∨ ¬∀x.A(x) is limit-BHK-correct.
Since x is recursively computable when ∃x.A(x) holds, 01-LEM ∃x.A(x)∨¬∃x.A(x) is also limit-BHK-correct. Take
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T (e, e, x) as A(x), where T is Kleene’s T-predicate. Then giving a realizer for 01-LEM or 01-LEM means giving a
function answering to Turing’s halting problem.
Next we consider 02-DNE. Assume ¬¬∃x.∀y.P (x, y) is limit-BHK-correct for a recursive predicate P. Then∃x.∀y.P (x, y) holds classically and we can deﬁne a guessing function g converging to such an x as follows:
g(t) = 0(h(t)),
h(0) = (0, 0),
h(n + 1) =
{
(0(h(n)), 1(h(n)) + 1) if P(0(h(n)), 1(h(n))),
(0(h(n)) + 1, 0) if ¬P(0(h(n)), 1(h(n))),
0 and 1 are projection functions, i.e., 0((x, y)) = x and 1((x, y)) = y.
Since a trivial guessing function of ∀y.P (x, y) is given if ∀y.P (x, y) is classically true, it is easy to deﬁne a guessing
function k(t) for ∃x.∀y.P (x, y). Thus, 02-DNE is limit-BHK-correct with the guessing function l(x, t) deﬁned by
l(x, t) = k(t).
5. Learning in the limit and proof animation
In this section, I will explain why “learning” in the limit would be useful for proof animation. The contents of this
section largely depends on clariﬁcations and suggestions by one of reviewers of the paper.
The semantics described above is based on the notion of “computation in the limit” appeared in [25]. Computation
in the limit means that functions are “computable” relative to the halting problem K as an oracle. Such functions are
also simply called K-recursive. In this respect, the semantics described in the previous sections can be understood in
the context of recursion theory.
On the other hand, Gold’s model of learning in the limit concerns a limiting process of another type: the learner sees
more and more information on an object X and then has to come up with ﬁnite information answering the question
under investigation. The ﬁnite information is a program for X in case of function learning, an enumeration procedure
for a set X in the case of learning r.e. languages, an index of a class in the case of classifying some sequences according
to a ﬁnite or inﬁnite number of classes.
Although it is possible to interpret our realizability interpretation in pure recursion theoretic framework, it is better
to relate it to learning theory and so doing is much more suggestive and productive. A typical example which relates
learning theory to LCM is the minimum number principle (MNP) “there is an m such that for all n, f (m)f (n) holds”,
where f is a function from the natural numbers to the natural numbers. It is formalized as follows:
∃m.∀n.f (m)f (n).
The function f may be regarded as a recursive function, and then the realizability interpretation of this principle
maintains that m is obtained by a K-recursive function. But, it is much better to regard f as an input stream in the
sense of programming languages. An input stream f (0), f (1), . . . is a possibly inﬁnite series of data supplied by the
environment which is uncontrollable and unpredictable. A series of characters input from keyboard is a typical input
stream. Then, no one can predict the next value of the input stream. Nonetheless, we can “ﬁnd” the value m attaining
the minimum of f (m) by learning in the limit process. We write down zero on a blackboard. When, the next value
f (1) comes in from the stream, we compare f (0) on the board with f (1). If f (1)f (0) holds, then we do nothing. If
f (0) < f (1) holds, then we erase 0 on the board and write 1. We continue the same process inﬁnitely. Eventually, the
number m on the board attains the minimum of the value of the f (m) and stops changing. This is a learning process in
the sense of algorithmic learning theory. Actually, this problem of ﬁnding m is the same as the classiﬁcation problem
of functions with respect to the classes Cy = {f |y = min{f (x)|x = 0, 1, . . .}}.
More important yet, learning in the limit is better than K-recursiveness in modelizing the debugging process as
Shapiro [24] used learning theory for his algorithmic debugging. Program debugging process is interactive and the
input stream f can be considered as an ever expanding set of test cases in the sense of xUnit testing framework in [6].
EX-learning is easily modelized by limiting realization of the formula ∃e.∀x.f (x) = e(x), where e stands for the
S. Hayashi / Theoretical Computer Science 350 (2006) 125–139 131
recursive function of the index e, and the stream f (0), f (1), . . . , or equivalently, the set {(x, f (x))|x = 0, 1, . . .}
could be regarded as the complete test suite for the program e which implements f. 4
Proof animation is a technology for debugging proofs. Since a proof is not a function or a set, there is no complete
test suite for a proof. Nonetheless, as the MNP could be interpreted by a learning process, debugging of proofs is
naturally modelized by learning process via our realizability interpretation. To show how proof animation by learning
in the limit is adequate for debugging of proofs, we illustrate an imaginary session of proof animation in the below.
Assume that I was developing a formal proof of a sort of MNP. I deﬁne a metric on the interval [m, n] of the set of
integers by the distance from n. For example, the metric of n is 0 and the metric of m is |n − m|. I introduce a linear
order by means of the metric. Thus, n is the smallest element and n − 7 is larger than n − 3, since their metrics are 7
and 3, respectively.
What I wish to prove is MNP for this ordering
∃x.∀y.Pm,n(f (x), f (y)), (1)
where f is a function from the natural numbers to the interval and Pm,n(x, y) represent “x is less than or equals to y in
the ordering”.
The metric of x is formally deﬁned by |x − n|. Thus, the formal deﬁnition of Pm,n(x, y) should be |y − n| |x − n|.
My proof language has the built-in predicate  , but does not have a built-in for  . So I have to use the  − sign.
Before starting to type in the formal deﬁnition, I felt tired and went to the common room to have a cup of tea. When
I returned to the ofﬁce, I began to type in the formal deﬁnition of Pm,n(x, y) as |x− n| |y− n|.
I develop some lemmas andmy very clever proof checker automatically chose an appropriate mathematical induction
and proves the principle (1) from the lemmas. Since the proof checker proved it, we are very sure about the correctness
of the principle.
It might be better to animate the proof to see what kind of limiting computation processes are present in the proof. f
may be programmed, but it is easier to input the values of f interactively from the keyboard. Set m = −2 and n = 7.
We input as f (0) = 3.
The tool returns the ﬁrst guess “x would be 0 and the value f (x) is 3”. It is ok. I have given only one data item to
the animator. Thus, it should be the guess.
Next, I will input f (1) = 7 to see the mind change. Since 7 is the least element, a mind change must happen. I type
in.... The proof animator replies “I do not change mind”. Alas! What happened? Maybe a serious bug in the animator. I
got crazy and typed in “f (2) = 2”. The animator replies “I changed my mind. x would be 2 and the value f (x) is 2”.
The mind changes are just opposite to the expected. I suspect my deﬁnitions and ﬁnd Pm,n(x, y) was deﬁned
|x− n| |y− n| instead of |y− n| |x− n|.
But, why the proof checker proved the wrong proposition? No, it did not prove wrong proposition. The two orders
of x and y deﬁned by |x− n| |y− n| and |y− n| |x− n| are symmetrically isomorphic. The proof checker proved
the correct proposition. Only one thing was wrong. The deﬁned order was not the intended one.
Since the proof checker cannot know the intention in my mind, it could not detect the slip. Only when I interacted
with the proof consulting my intention, I could ﬁnd the gap between the formal deﬁnition and the intention.
Note that the interaction was possible since we use limiting realizability, since the principle is essentially non-
constructive and so the constructive proof animation in [18] is not applicable. Furthermore, learning in the limit
naturally modelized the interaction sequence between user and animator.
6. Mind change hierarchy of propositions
In the realizations of semi-classical principles given in Section 3, realizers for 01- and 01-LEM are apparently
simpler than the realizers for 02-DNE. The ﬁrst guess of the realizer given for01-LEM (01-LEM) is ﬁxed to the ∀ side
(¬∃-side) and a mind change happens if a counterexample is found. For example, the guessing function of the realizer
for 01-LEM is deﬁned by g(t) = 0 if ∃x < t.A(x) and g(t) = 1 if ∀x < t.¬A(x). Thus realizers of 01-LEM belong
4 A test suite is a group of test cases, by which we often “specify” a small unit of functionality of the program to be built. See [6] for details. It
would be worth to note that TDD methodology in [6] can be considered as a practical version of programming by examples, which is an application
of learning theory to programming. See [17] for detailed discussions.
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to −11 class of Ershov’s boolean hierarchy [13]. On the other hand, the realizers for 02-DNE need the full Ershov
hierarchy. In this sense, 02-DNE is stronger than 01- and 01-LEM, and 01-and 01-LEM have the same strength.
Some mathematical propositions have intermediate strengths. For example, the natural realizer of MNP ∃m.∀n.
f (m)f (n) does at most f (0)-time mind changes. (We guess m = 0. If we ﬁnd a smaller f (i) then we change mind
to m = i and repeat the process.) These examples show that the formulas realizable by recursive guessing functions
may be classiﬁed ﬁnely by Ershov’s mind change hierarchy or something like that. We do not know what kind of
mind change hierarchy is appropriate for classifying LCM-valid formulas and their realizers. One of the reviewers has
suggested Parsimony Hierarchy by Ambainis, Case et al. [3] might provide a more direct classiﬁcation than Ershov
hierarchy.
Even if we use Ershov’s idea, our hierarchy may differ. Our guessing functions are not always converging for all
natural numbers. 5 This might make difference from the original Ershov hierarchy, since limiting partial functions of
partial recursive functions may be beyond 02 (seeYamazaki’s example in [21]).
7. A hierarchy by formal provability
In Section 6, we considered the strengths of semi-classical principles via interpretations (semantical hierarchy).
There is another kind of hierarchy via derivability (syntactical hierarchy). Hierarchy via derivability is the one used in
proof theoretic studies such as reverse mathematics. Some base systems are ﬁxed and logical principles are compared
with their strength via these systems. Proof checkers are formal systems implemented on computers. Thus this kind of
research is quite important for proof animation. It would show which kind of theorems can be animated by PA/LCM-
technology, and which kind of semi-classical principles are appropriate to animate a particular theorem.
We call it calibration of classical principles. The basis of the calibration theory is the syntactical hierarchy of
semi-classical principles. The hierarchy of arithmetical semi-classical principles has been determined in [1]. The next
step is to classify classical theorems with respect to this hierarchy. Some results have been already known. MNP and
01-LEM are provably equivalent in the standard formal system of ﬁrst order intuitionistic arithmetic augmented with
a free function variable. A formulation of existence of step functions such as y = [x] over real numbers is equivalent
to 02-LEM. Toftdal [28] has given some elaborated calibration results in analysis and Berardi [8] has given some
calibration results for 02-LEM or stronger.
The standard intuitionistic formal systems are too weak to derive 01-LEM from 01-LEM by the lack of ability
to prove 01-DNE (Markov’s principle). 01-DNE is realized even by the original Kleene realizability. Thus some
intuitionistic systems contain it. However, most systems do not contain it. For example, standard logic of constructive
proof checkers as COQ does not include it. Similarly, 02-DNE is not derivable from 01-LEM. Thus, this hierarchy
is not the same as expected in the standard recursion theory. There is a weaker but still natural form of existence
statement of Gauss function which is equivalent to 01-LEM but not to 01-LEM. Since the difference actually affects
mathematical theory to be formalized, the syntactical hierarchy should be analyzed.
In the syntactical hierarchy,MNPand01-LEMare equivalent, sinceMNP is derivable from01-LEMbymathematical
induction [16]. Mathematical induction enables to use 01-LEM repeatedly. For example, 2 mind changes in Ershov’s
sense is easily attainable by double induction, which is derived from the ordinary mathematical induction. Then a
natural question arises. Is it possible to make the syntactical hierarchy ﬁner according to mind change hierarchy?
Linear logic is sensitive to the number of applications of axioms or assumptions. A ﬁner interpretation we should
seek may be an interpretation of linear logic or something like that. A ﬁne hierarchy might be obtained by restricting
induction principle as reverse mathematics [26].
8. Weak König Lemma, LLPO and Popperian game
In the syntactic hierarchy of LCM principles, Weak König Lemma, abbreviated to WKL, is especially interesting.
WKL is a theorem for binary trees
• Any binary-branching tree with inﬁnite many nodes has an inﬁnite path.
5 Every limit of partial functions can be extended to the limit of a total function. However, the limit obtained might not be total by itself. Thus,
we cannot replace partial functions with total functions.
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Harvey Friedman found that this principle is logically as weak as Hilbert’s ﬁnite standpoint in a certain logical envi-
ronment but proves many important mathematical theorems such as the completeness theorem of ﬁrst order predicate
logic. On this unexpected ﬁnding, Simpson and his colleagues developed an interesting theory of “reversemathematics”
[26]. They calibrated mathematical theorems by means of WKL or the like. For example, they prove whether WKL is
necessary to prove a theorem.
After the low basis theorem and results of reversemathematics, Ishihara andKohlenbach pointed out thatWKLwould
be important in LCM as well. They and Berardi, Yamazaki and Hayashi jointly found some interesting relationships
between WKL and lesser limited principles of omniscience (LLPO), a principle in constructive mathematics, and the
position of WKL in LCM hierarchy.
The syntactical hierarchy of LCM including WKL was very similar to the one of reverse mathematics. Although our
hierarchy is ﬁner than the one of reverse mathematics, many techniques developed in reverse mathematics were quite
useful to investigate our syntactical hierarchy. 6
After the works, I raised an open problem to ﬁnd a learning theoretic framework that corresponds to this weak
classical principle in the proceedings version of the present paper [14]. An unexpected solution was found very soon
after sending the manuscript to the editor. It turned out that a series of realizability interpretations coined by Lifschitz
[20] and extended by van Oosten [30] is the right framework to represent logical aspect ofWKL.Although Lifschitz and
van Oosten were unaware of learning theoretic aspects of their works, it is straightforward to give a learning theoretic
framework corresponding to their interpretation.
The underlying idea of our learning theoretic framework resembles the philosopher Karl Popper’s “falsiﬁability” or
“refutability”, e.g. [23]. Popper claimed that a theory is scientiﬁc only when it is clearly refutable by a counterexample.
A theory refuted by a counterexample drops and the other theories survive. By such selection with refutation, science
evolves and converges to the truth.
We formulate Popper’s idea in an algorithmic way. We assume that some theories are competing in a game to predict
the value of a given scientiﬁc constant. We restrict ourselves algorithmically. It means that realistic things must be
computable relative to observations. The observations can be modeled as an oracle O. We consider only functions and
reals etc. recursive relative to the oracle O.
Thus a scientiﬁc constant is a recursive real number relative to the oracle O. Each theory has its hypotheses by which
the constant value is logically predicted. We assume that every theory is algorithmically scientiﬁc in Popperian sense,
namely, every hypothesis is a 01-sentence, which are the only formulas that are algorithmically refutable. Since a
theory has only ﬁnitely many hypotheses, we regard a theory as the conjunction of these 01-sentences. Thus a theory
itself is a 01-sentence. By formalizing the situation, we have a framework which I call Popperian game.
A Popperian game is a ﬁnite set of players {(a1, P1(x1)), . . . , (an, Pn(xn))}. Each player is modeled by a pair of
predicted value ai and its background theory Pi(xi). A theory Pi(xi) is a predicate recursive relative to the oracle O,
which is interpreted as the 01-proposition ∀xi.Pi(xi).
If Pi is refuted by a counterexample u such that Pi(u) is false, then the player (ai, Pi) looses and drops from the
game. It is possible that more than one player win. Even none may win, since the game is continued even when only
one player is left. Even if all other theories are refuted and only one theory is left, the theory left may be incorrect.
The set of winners of a Popperian game S = {(a1, P1(x1)), . . . , (an, Pn(xn))} is deﬁned by {(ai, Pi(xi))|∀xi.Pi(xi)
holds} and is denoted as Win(S). The set of winning values is deﬁned by {ai |(ai, Pi(xi)) ∈ Win(S)} and is denoted by
WV(S).
A system of multivalued functions is deﬁned by means of Popperian game after Lifschitz realizability [20]. A
multivalued function over natural numbers is a function from the set of natural numbers to the set of ﬁnite sets of
natural numbers. A multivalued function f is PG-computable or Popperian game-computable, if there is a function
g recursive relative to the oracle O such that g(x) is a code of a Popperian game {(ax1 , P x1 (x1)), . . . , (axn, P xn (xn))}
deﬁned for x and f (x) = WV(g(x)) holds.
Lifschitz and van Oosten realizability interpretations can be reconstructed as realizability interpretations by PG-
computable multivalued (partial) functions. 7
6 The axiom of ACA0 of reverse mathematics represents the entire arithmetical hierarchy, i.e. the union of 0(n) for all n. On the other hand,
0n-LEM represents only 0(n).
7 Note that the oracle O is not essential for their original cases. The only reason for using the oracle is to make the Popperian game more natural
from the viewpoints of learning theory and discovery science.
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The logical (or set theoretical) principle embodying the notion of Popperian game (or PG-computability) is WKL in
the following form:
∀f.(T is an inﬁnite binary tree recursive in f ⇒∃g.(g is an inﬁnite path of T ))
This scheme is realizable by realizability interpretations with PG-computable functions.
The important point is that we can apply the same principle again to trees constructed recursively in the path g just
as in the usual logic. This is the difference from the other LCM principles such as 01-LEM, which cannot be applied
repeatedly.
LCM-WKL is intuitionistically equivalent to “01-LLPO+01-b-AC00”, where 01-LLPO is
∀x.¬(∃y.Af (x, y) ∧ ∃y.Bf (x, y))⇒∀y.¬Af (x, y) ∨ ∀y.¬Bf (x, y)
and 01-b-AC00 is a very weak axiom of choice
∀x.(∀y.Af (x, y) ∨ ∀y.Bf (x, y))⇒ ∃g.∀x.(g(x) = 0⇒∀y.Af (x, y)) ∧ (g(x) = 1⇒∀y.Bf (x, y))].
In these schemes, Af and Bf are predicates recursive in f.
01-LLPO is an LCM version of an intuitionistic principle “Lesser Limited Principles of Omniscience” [10]. LLPO
may be regarded as a veryweak law of excludedmiddle.01-LEM implies it.01-b-AC00 is also derivable from01-LEM
with the help of a very weak function principle.
These ultra weak laws of excluded middle are yet adequate to prove many important theorems constructively, e.g.,
the completeness theorem of predicate logic. This fact remarkably resembles reverse mathematics [26].Actually, proofs
of corresponding results in reverse mathematics go through in LCM almost without changes.
A classical formal system WKL0 of Weak König Lemma in reverse mathematics has a countable model which has
only countably many sets coded by a low set. 8 Another realizability interpretation which realizes these weak LCM
principles can be obtained by the standard Kleene realizability interpretation by means of partial functions recursive
in the countable model.
9. A game semantics
One of the origins of LCM was Berardi’s approximation interpretation of classical logic [4]. Berardi’s interpretation
was motivated by Coquand’s game semantics for classical logic [12]. Thus, it is natural that there are some relationships
between Coquand’s game semantics and LCM semantics. One of the reviewers of the present paper, who is perhaps
unaware of Coquand’s game semantics, outlined a game semantics with mind changes and asked me if the semantics
or alike is equivalent to LCM for the prenex normal forms. The mind change rule and convergence criteria that the
reviewer gave were not clear. Thus, we understood it as Coquand’s semantics.
Coquand’s semantics is fully classical and is thus beyondLCM.However, it turned out thatCoquand’s game semantics
coincides with LCM realizability interpretation, when its mind change rule (backtracking rule) is restricted to a simpler
rule. The game with the simpler rule was practically identical to the one considered and called simple backtracking in
a preliminary version of [12].
The restricted rule is more natural than the one given in [12] from the game theoretic point of view. It is likely that
this game semantics is a key to better understanding of LCM semantics, and it would give a better proof animation
methodology. Here, I brieﬂy report the semantics as an answer to the reviewer. This is a joint workwithThierry Coquand
and Stefano Berardi, and we are still working on its details.
In game semantics, e.g., [12], only positive formulas are considered. A formula is positive iff it is built up from
atomic formulas for recursive predicates with only ∀, ∃, ∨ and ∧. In the standard game semantics of logic, formulas
are inﬁnitary propositional formulas with inﬁnite or ﬁnite disjunctions and conjunctions as connectives. It is easy to
map positive formulas of ﬁrst order arithmetic to such inﬁnitary propositional formulas. Since LCM semantics is not
8 A set is low, if the jump of its degree is equal to the degree 0′.
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deﬁned for such inﬁnitary formulas, we consider only positive formulas of arithmetic. Furthermore, positive formulas
are constructively transformed to prenex formulas. For example, consider a generic instance of 02 -LEM
∃x.∀y.T (e, x, y) ∨ ∀a.∃b.T −(e, a, b), (2)
where T is the Kleene’s T-predicate and T − is an atomic formula representing the negation of T. This is equiva-
lent in HA (Heyting Arithmetic; The ﬁrst order formal system of intuitionistic arithmetic) to the following prenex
formula:
∃x.∀a.∃b.∀y.((x > 0 ∧ T (e, x − 1, y)) ∨ (x = 0 ∧ T −(e, a, b))). (3)
It is easy to transform any positive formula to a prenex normal form in a similar way.We consider only prenex formulas
below.
We brieﬂy explain Coquand’s game semantics with deep mind changes (backtracking) developed in [12]. A game
on a prenex formula is played by two players Eloise and Abelard. We illustrate the game by an example
∃x1.∀y1.∃x2.∀y2.x1 + y1x2 + y2.
Eloise is supposed to give a witness for existential quantiﬁer, ∃x1 and ∃x2. Abelard is supposed to give a witness for
universal quantiﬁer, ∀y1 and ∀y2.
Since the outermost quantiﬁer is ∃x1, Eloise moves ﬁrst, e.g., by taking x1 = 7. Then, Abelard moves, e.g., by
y1 = 11. Then, for example, Eloise moves with x2 = 18 andAbelard moves with y2 = 4. Now, it is Eloise’s turn. But,
there is no quantiﬁer anymore, thus, they start to evaluate which side wins by looking at the innermost atomic formula.
Now, it is 7 + 1118 + 4. Since this is true, Eloise wins. If she had played x2 = 17, Abelard could play y2 = 0 to
make the formula false 7 + 1117 + 0. Then, Eloise loses and Abelard wins. Note that Eloise has a winning strategy
taking x2 = x1 + y1. We suppose that all moves executed are recorded and the both players can review them anytime.
This is the standard notion of games associated to prenex formulas. It is easy to see that Eloise has a recursive winning
strategy iff the formula of the game is recursively realizable in Kleene’s sense.
Coquand extended this notion of game to classical logic. In Coquand semantics, Abelard plays just as in the game
described above, but Eloise is allowed to change mind. She is allowed to go back to any point in the game so far played.
We may assume that all the moves are recorded on a piece of paper in the chronological order. Eloise may change her
mind on her turn. She may ﬂush the current state of the play and reset it to a past state of the play. For example, suppose
that she mistakenly moved as x2 = 1 in the above play and Abelard moved as y2 = 0 and won. When she noted her
loss, she may backtrack to the position of her move for x2 and say x2 = 18. Then she can win. This backtrack is also
recorded on the paper.
It is known that a prenex formula is classically valid iff it has a recursive strategy in the games with backtracking.
I describe a winning strategy for 02-LEM (3) given above.
Below, Abelard will be denoted by ∀ and Eloise will be denoted by ∃. A round in which ∃ moves with x = 11
and ∀ moves with a = 8 will be denoted by [x = 11; a = 8]. A state of a play is a ﬁnite sequence of rounds and
will be denoted as “[x = 0; a = 3], [b = 8; y = 11]”. For example, the ﬁrst example of play which led to ∃’s win
“7 + 1118 + 4” is denoted by a state “[x1 = 7; y1 = 11], [x2 = 18; y2 = 4]”. Note that state of the play was called
“occurrence” in [12]. A play with backtracking consists of a ﬁnite sequence of state u0, u1, u2, . . . starting with empty
state. un+1 is obtained from one of ui (i < n) by adding a round.
I will give an example session of Eloise’s recursive winning strategy for (3):
u0: “”. The initial empty state consisting of zero rounds.
u1: “[x = 0; a = A1]”. The ﬁrst round. A1 is a number played by ∀.
u2: “[x = A1 + 1; a = A2]”. ∃ backtracks to u0 and replay with x = A1 + 1 and asks ∀ the next move. He moves
with a = A2.
u3: “[x = A1 + 1; a = A2], [b = 1; y = A3]”. A new round is added after u2. ∃’s move b = 1 is a dummy. After
this, we have two cases. If T (e,A1, A3) is true, then ∃ wins and ∃ stops the play. If it’s false, ∃ backtracks to u1 and
continues to play as follows:
u4: “[x = 0; a = A1], [b = A3; y = A4]”. Then, ∃ wins with T −(e, A1, A3) for any A4, since T (e,A1, A3) is false.
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A winning strategy for ∃ is modeled by a function (“u1, . . . , un”) which gives the next ∃’s move, namely one of
the following:
(i) (“u0, u1, u2”) is a number, e.g., 1. of b = 1 in u3: “[x = A1 + 1; a = A2], [b = 1; y = A3]” above. No
backtracking, in this case.
(ii) (“u0, u1, u2, u3”) is a pair of a backtracking point and a number, e.g., (u1, A3) for u4: “[x = 0; a = A1], [b =
A3; y = A4]” above. First, the current state is set to u1: “[x = 0; a = A1]” and Eloise moves with b = A3.
A backtracking takes place, in this case.
See [12] for details.
As we have seen, Coquand’s game validates more than LCM. The formula (3) is not realizable by limiting functions,
since a 02-function cannot decide the universal 02-formula ∃x.∀y.T (e, x, y). Thus, the game semantics with the full
backtracks does not characterize LCM semantics. However, when backtracks are restricted to simple backtracks, the
game semantics coincides with LCM semantics.
Recall that a play with backtracking was a ﬁnite sequence of state u0, u1, u2, . . . , where the condition
un+1 is obtained from one of ui (i < n) by adding a round
is met. We restrict the backtrack points to the substate of un, i.e.,
un+1 is obtained from one of ui (i < n) by adding a round, and such a ui must be a substate of un.
State S1 is a substate of state S2 iff S1 is a segment of S2. Namely, S1 is obtained from S2 by “popping up” some rounds
from the tail. Thus, a more natural equivalent deﬁnition is
A play with simple backtracking consists of a ﬁnite sequence of states u0, u1, u2, . . . starting with the empty
state. un+1 is obtained from a substate of un by adding a round.
The original game in [12] has a quite complicated form of backtracking: if we think of the game as a debate, Eloise
cannot only change her mind, but also resume a previous position in the discussion that she had given up for a while.
This complicated behavior is precisely what is forbidden in the simple backtracking.
A game consisting of playswith simple backtracks is called a simple game. Observe that the strategy for (3) backtracks
from the state u3 “[x = A1 + 1; a = A2], [b = 1; y = A3]” to the state u1 “[x = 0; a = A1]”, which is not a substate
of u3. It is a deep backtracking not allowed in simple games.
Actually, we can prove for any prenex normal formula that there is a recursive winning strategy of simple game for
∃ iff the formula is realizable by the LCM-realizability interpretation, which is given in the appendix.
10. Conclusion
The research on LCM has begun recently. There are still plenty of problems to be solved. LCM is a mathematics
of approximation in a very wide sense including identiﬁcation in the limit. In practical mathematics, some kinds
of approximations are inevitable. We are trying to relate LCM to practical mathematics like numerical analysis and
computer algebra. Theories and techniques developed in learning theory must be very useful and indispensable in these
researches.
Investigations of links between learning theory, reverse mathematics and LCM must be fruitful to understand the
relationship between learning theory and LCM. There are some interesting resemblances between these three. It has
been shown that the ideals of the polynomial ring over the rationals in n variables is EX-learnable with mind change
bound n but not less than n [27]. In reverse mathematics, Hilbert ﬁnite basis theorem for the same polynomial rings
for all n is equivalent to transﬁnite induction up to  [26]. In LCM, the same theorem is proved by n-fold induction
and 01-LEM, which lead to n mind change in Ershov’s sense. Are there any formal relationships between these areas
by which these resemblances are clearly explained?
Another challenging problem is to ﬁnd logics corresponding to the other paradigms of learning theory such as PAC-
learning. PAC-learning does not straightforwardly correspond to the standard logic. A logic of PAC-learning will be a
kind of probabilistic logic.
It is known that Logic of discovery [5] by Bardzins, Freivalds, and Smith resembles LCM at the lower level of
hierarchy. Are there any deeper relationships between them?
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Appendix A. Realizabilities
In this appendix, a Kleene style realizability for ﬁrst order LCM and a modiﬁed realizability for LCM are given.
A realizability similar to the Kleene style realizability has been given in [21]. The one given here is designed in a little
bit more learning theoretic way and closer to Berardi’s limit-semantic [9].
It should be noted that if guessing functions g(x, t) are all trivial, i.e. g(x, t) = g(x, 0), then the realizabilities given
below turn to realizability of intuitionistic logic. Then realizers are computable (partial) functions.
10.1. Kleene style limit-realizability
We give a Kleene style limit-realizability interpretation. In this approach, we regard guessing functions as their
indices. Thus, we assume  an acceptable programming system or an acceptable system of indices of partial recursive
functions (see [22]). We assume a standard coding of ﬁnite sequences of numbers and write, e.g., (a1, . . . , an) for the
code of the sequences a1, . . . , an. A pair is regarded as a sequence with two elements. i is a computable function
retrieving i-th element of sequence as a code. An index of n-ary function f (x1, . . . , xn) is regarded as an index of
1-ary function f ′ such as f ′((x1, . . . , xn)) = f (x1, . . . , xn). We ﬁx an algorithm to compute p from q, r so that
p(x) = (q(x),r (x)). p is called the standard paring index of the indices q and r. Although it is not necessary, it
make things easier to assume q and r are computable from p. We assume it here.
Let A1, . . . , An, B be formulas of ﬁrst order arithmetic and let x1, . . . , xm be a ﬁnite sequence of variables including
all free variables of the n + 1 formulas. Furthermore, r1, . . . , rn is a sequence of fresh n-variables. A tuple
[x1, . . . , xm,A1, . . . , An, r1, . . . , rn, B]
is called a formula with context. [x1, . . . , xm,A1, . . . , An, r1, . . . , rn] is called context and B is called body. We denote
the context by  and a formula with context as [, B]. These notions are borrowed from type theory. They are not
really necessary for our deﬁnition but make things much clearer.
We deﬁne a ﬁrst order condition “r r [, B]” for each formula with context [, B]. (r is a new free variable.)
Although we will deﬁne it in English, it can be formalized by a ﬁrst order arithmetical formula including function
symbol for  of the index system.
The condition “r r [, B]” is called the realization or realizability interpretation of [, B]. If x1, . . . , xn is an
enumeration of free variables of B, then the realization of [x1, . . . , xn, B] is called the realization of B and we write
r r B. The conditions are deﬁned so that if r r B holds, then r is an index of a total recursive functions. Such functions
are called guessing functions or guessing realizers of the formula with context. It should be noted that the standard
concept of “realizers” do not correspond to guessing realizers but correspond to their limits limt g.
The deﬁnition of realization is done by cases on B using an induction over the complexity deﬁned as the sum of the
logical signs in A1, . . . , An and B. In the deﬁnition, we intend r to be index of m + n + 1-ary total recursive guessing
function g(x1, . . . , xm, r1, . . . , rn, t) of B. Thus, we may regard it as a condition deﬁning “guessing function of B”. We
will list the deﬁnition of realization below.We say context is realizedwhen ri r [x1, . . . , xm,Ai] holds for i = 1, . . . , n.
10.1.1. Case 1: B is an atomic formula
r is an index of a total recursive function andr (x1, . . . , xm, r1, . . . , rn, t) convergeswhenever the context is realized.
10.1.2. Case 2: B is B1 ∧ B2
r is the standard pairing index of indices s1 and s2. If the context is realized, then s1 r [, B1] and s2 r [, B2].
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10.1.3. Case 3: B is B1 ∨ B2
r is the standard pairing index of indices s1 and s2. If the context is realized, then s1(x1, . . . , xm, r1, . . . , rn, t)
converges. Let p be the limit value. If p = 0 then s2 r [, B1]. If p 
= 0 then s2 r [, B2].
10.1.4. Case 4: B is B1 ⇒B2
r is an index of a total recursive function. We consider a new context 0:
[x1, . . . , xm,A1, . . . , An, B1, r1, . . . , rn, rn+1].
If 0 is realized, then r (x1, . . . , xm, r1, . . . , rn, rn+1, t) converges to a value b and b r B2.
10.1.5. Case 5: B is ∀x.C
r is an index of a total recursive function.We consider a new context 1:
[x1, . . . , xm, x,A1, . . . , An, r1, . . . , rn].
If 1 is realized, then r (x1, . . . , xm, x, r1, . . . , rn, t) converges to a value b and b r [1, C].
10.1.6. Case 6: B is ∃x.C
r is the standard pairing index of indices s1 and s2. r (x1, . . . , xm, r1, . . . , rn, t) converges whenever the context is
realized. s2 r [, C[t/x]], where t is the numeral representing limt s1(x1, . . . , xm, r1, . . . , rn, t).
It is easy to see that a guessing realizer is always a total recursive function. Similarly to the Theorem 7 of [21], the
soundness theorem holds, i.e., if A is provable in HA+02-DNE, then a number p is effectively computable and p r A.
The partial recursive function p represents a formal version of guessing function of A in limit-BHK-interpretation.
Without loss of generality, we may assume guessing functions of ∀x.A(x) and A⇒B are trivial. Namely, g(x, 0) =
g(x, t) for all t. Let us assume g be a guessing function of ∀x.A(x). limt g(x, t) converges to an index of guessing
function for A(x). To realize A, we compute two nested limits limt limt g(x,t)(t). It is equivalent to a single limit
limt g(x,t)(t). Let h be a recursive function such that h(x)(t) = g(x,t)(t). Then g′ deﬁned by g′(x, t) = h(x) can
replace g.
The realizability given here is different from the one given in [21] in two respects. The realizability in [21] is based
on an axiomatic recursion theory BRFT. Here, acceptable programming systems are used instead. Since acceptable
programming systems may have dynamic complexity measures, the problem of limits of partial guessing functions in
[21] does not arise. A limit BRFT system whose guessing functions are restricted to total functions can be deﬁned for
any BRFT with Blum’s dynamic complexity measure (cf. Lemma 1.1, [11]). Thus, we assumed guessing functions are
total as usual.
The other difference is the points where limit are evaluated. As noted above, guessing functions for implication and
universal formulas could be trivial. This is not so in [21]. On the other hand, guessing realizer of ∃x.A was deﬁned so
that it includes the value of x. A guessing realizer g of ∀x.∃y.A(x, y) in this paper, may return in the limit an index of
a guessing function h of ∃y.A(x, y) for input x. Thus evaluation of limit to retrieve y could be postponed till the limit
of h is evaluated. On the other hand, in [21], g was assumed to return a natural number y itself instead of its guessing
function h. Thus, g could not avoid evaluation of limit and g could not be trivial in general.
Berardi introduced a semantics based on limit-natural numbers [9]. Limit-natural numbers N∗ are 0-ary guessing
functions converging to natural numbers. From classical point of view,N∗ is isomorphic to the standard natural numbers
N. However there is no recursive isomorphism formN∗ toN. In this sense, they differ. Berardi has developed constructive
theory of non-constructive functions using this trick. The guessing functions of formulas with empty context can be
regarded asBerardi’s limit-natural numbers. In this respect, ours interpretationmay be thought a non-standard semantics
of number theory with limit-numbers.
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